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Japan's Trade Surplus 
The size of  the Japanese trade surplus with the 
United States and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) has seriously impaired 
trade relations among the three major trading 
partners. It has led to a growing debate over 
the effects of  trade imbalances on domestic 
economies. Some policymakers in the U.S. 
and the EEC have blamed their trade deficits 
for widespread domestic recession and un-
employment, while others believe that their 
economic malaise is not a consequence of 
foreign competition but a reflection of struc-
tural problems in Western economies. 
Which side is correct in this debate? Last year, 
the Japanese trade surplus with the EEC 
reached $10.3 billion compared with $8.8 
billion in 1980, and the U.S. bilateral trade 
deficit with Japan registered $13.4 billion, 
nearly double the 1980 shortfall of $7 billion. 
Projections by the international Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment indicate this trend will continue 
through 1983. 
The critics who blame Japan are calling for 
voluntary restraints on Japanese exports or 
the imposition of import  quotas in theircoun-
tries. Other analysts argue that the Western 
economies would be better off emulating 
Japan's performance by restoring the cost 
competitiveness of their industries. They 
stress that import or export quotas serve only 
as short-term palliatives thattemporarily shel-
ter inefficient industries from the rigors of 
competition. 
An examination of  the economic factors 
responsible for the large and growing trade 
surplus can be a valuable aid to our under-
standing of  this issue. It will also provide a 
basis for analyzing the implications of future 
economic policy in this area. Below, we 
focus on Japan's export performance as a 
means of highlighting what we consider the 
most significant aspects of  the situation. 
Cost competitiveness 
Commentators often note that because Japan 
devotes a higher proportion of its output to 
investment than any other major industrial-
ized country, it has had a much higher growth 
, in labor productivity. They claim these in-
creases in output per manhour have im-
proved the cost competitiveness of  Japanese 
products in world markets. For example, from 
1975 onward, labor productivity growth 
averaged 7.6 percent in Japan, 3.2 percent in 
the U.S., and 3.7 percent in the EEC. Further-
more, this higher labor productivity growth, 
and its beneficial impact on competitiveness, 
was not offset by higher nominal wage settle-
ments by Japanese workers, unlike their 
American and European counterparts. As a 
result, labor costs per unit of manufacturing 
output have remained virtually unchanged in 
Japan since 1975, while they have increased 
at an average annual rate of  7.8 percent in the 
U.S. and 11.4 percent in the EEC. 
Japan's successful containment of labor costs 
wou  Id seem to provide a cogent explanation 
for its expanding trade surplus. But these 
costs are measured in domestic currency 
units. Adjusting for exchange rate changes 
shows that Japan's cost competitiveness was 
actually deteriorating through the third quar-
ter of 1978 (see chart). However, from that 
point on, the yen exchange rate-far from 
compensating for international differences in 
unit labor costs-has depreciated sharply 
against the u.s. dollar. The drop in the yen's 
exchange rate, most notably in the last four 
quarters, has dramatically bolstered Japan's 
competitive position in world markets. 
Exchange rates and oil prices 
The reversal of  the upward trend in the yen 
rate can, in part, be ascribed to a coincident 
run-up in oil prices. Because oil represents 40 
percent of  the Japanese import bill, the sharp 
rise in oil prices in the late 1970's greatly 
enlarged Japan's import costs. As a result, the 
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the price competitiveness of  Japanese goods. 
The depreciation thereby created the foreign 
demand for a greater quantity of  Japanese 
exports. The increased exports found their 
way into the u.s. and EEC markets and thus 
raised Japan's market share during the period 
of widespread recession and unemployment. 
On a trade-weighted basis, the yen depre-
ciated 21.4 percent between the second half 
of 1978 and the first half of 1980. This drop, 
resulting in part from oil price hikes, contri-
buted to a 32.4 percent gain in Japanese cost 
competitiveness in the same period as rela-
tive unit labor costs also moved in Japan's 
favor. The improvement in Japan's cost 
competitiveness led to a fall in the dollar 
price of  Japanese manufactured goods rela-
tive to foreign competitors of 13.6 percent 
between 1978 and 1980. This improvement 
in Japan's price competitiveness can largely 
account for the 26.5 percent growth in export 
volume between 1979 and 1981. Because of 
this exceptionally strong export volume 
growth, the total trade account of  Japan 
moved from a deficit of $9.3 billion in the first 
halfof 1980to  a surplus of  $8.9 billion for the 
year 1981  as a whole. 
Fiscal and monetary policies 
More recently, the yen exchange rate has 
continued to decline against the dollar de-
spite the fall in energy prices. This apparent 
paradox has been attributed by many 
observers to the different mix of monetary 
and fiscal policies instituted in the two coun-
tries. Japanese officials believe Washington's 
economic policy involving big budget defi-
. cits and monetary restraint has produced 
abnormally high real interest rates that have 
dramatically bolstered the dollar's value in 
the foreign exchange markets. They therefore 
feel that the dollar's strong performance 
against the yen is due entirely to U.S. macro-
economic policy. 
Japanese macroeconomic policy, however, 
has not been blameless in the depreciation of 
the yen. The Japanese government's mone-
tary and fiscal policy mix brought about a 
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three percentage point decline in Japanese 
short-term interest rates between December 
1980 and August 1982. The reduced yields 
coupled with a liberalization of  capital con-
trols in December 1980 increased the attrac-
tiveness of  dollar denominated investments 
to Japanese residents, prompting capital out-
flows and a weak yen. Thus, the evidence 
implies that fiscal and monetary policies of 
both countries are responsible for the depre-
ciating yen and the resul~ing decline in u.s. 
price competitiveness. 
The confl  ict between U.5. and Japan over 
trade matters surfaced once before back in 
1977  -78. At that time, the u.s. advocated 
that West Germany and Japan, two countries 
with large trade and current account sur-
pluses, should inject fiscal stimuli to expand 
their economies. The resulting faster eco-
nomic growth would produce a higher level 
of imports, which, in turn, would reduce the 
trade and current account surpluses. Because 
the current account balance represents the 
amount of private savings left over after 
deducting the public sector deficit and pri-
vate investment, a higher publ  ic sector deficit 
with unchanged private savings and invest-
ment would, by definition, produce a com-
mensurate fall in the current account surplus. 
Thus, Japan could cut its projected surpluses 
on current account by increasing its fiscal 
deficit through higher public spending or 
lower taxes. 
In 1977 and 1978, Japan's economic 
environment was receptive to this course of 
action. The yen exchange rate was appre-
ciating markedly, creating slack economic 
conditions. A stimulatory fiscal policy would 
have posed no policy dilemma for Japan on 
domestic grounds; it would have comple-
mented the appreciating exchange rate in 
bringing about a lower current account 
surplus. 
The present economic environment in Japan 
is not too dissimilar. While the yen exchange 
rate has been depreciating against the dollar, 
economic activity has stagnated, in part because of a slowdown in export volume 
growth due to voluntary restraints on ship-
ments to Western Europe. Because real eco-
nomic activity in Japan is slowing, there is 
room for fiscal stimulus. The government, 
however, is adverse to do so because of 
already large fiscal deficits which have aver-
aged between 4 and 5 percent of GNP in the 
1978-1981 period, considerably higher than 
those of  the U.S. In fact, Japan's medium term 
strategy calls for reducing the growth of 
public spendingto bringthe budget back into 
balance by fiscal 1984/85. 
Further compounding the trade imbalance 
problem are the high and possibly growing 
budget deficits projected 'for the U.S. in the 
foreseeable future. A move toward fiscal 
restraint would improve the u.s. trade pic-
ture, but the fiscal policies presently adopted 
by the u.s.  and Japan, are likely to exacer-
bate the current account problems of  the two 
countries and further the trend towards 
protectionism. 
What to do? 
Contrary to popu lar opi  n  ion, Japan's expand-
ing trade surplus against the U.s. is not a 
product of lower labor cost increases and 
related productivity gains of  Japanese 
workers. Until the runup in oil prices, move-
ments of  the yen rate more than compensated 
for any cost advantage when Japan's labor 
costs were rising more slowly than those of 
the u.s. It was the fall in the yen's value, 
resulting, in part, from oil price hikes, that 
contributed greatly to the expansion of 
Japan's bilateral trade surplus with the U.S. 
More recently, the different mix of monetary 
and fiscal policies implemented in the two 
countries has added to the trade imbalance. 
The move towards fiscal expansion in the 
u.s. and fiscal restraint in Japan has exacer-
bated the trade and current account imbal-
ances between the two countries. And it is 
this misalignmentoffiscal actions, rather than 
a long-run decline in U.s. labor productivity, 
that has contributed to Japan's expanding 
trade surplus. 
Kenneth Bernauer and David Parsley 
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(Dollar amounts.in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross," adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 





































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Resente Position 
Excess Reserves (  + )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed( -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
'# Includes items not shown separately. 
9/8/82  9/1/82 
149  606 
14  6 
135  600 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
9,309  6.1 
10,419  8.0 
5,644  14.3 
3,189  5.9 
485  2.1 
1,015  74.4 
708  12.3 
1,818  - 11.9 
2,246  5.1 
1,849  - 6.2 
1,516  5.0 
13,126  15.3 
11,537  14.8 
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